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THE FIRST RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY: WHAT
WAS THE AGENDA?
 
Deborah A. DeMott*
I . INTRODUCTION
A scholarly distillation of the common law of agency may not seem an
obvious place to look for manifestations of reformist or progressive impulses,
however one defines them.  Indeed, one who questions whether agency
constitutes an independent subject as opposed to “the sum of a variety of
legally regulated relationships” might not bother with further inquiries.1
Fortunately, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) has never slighted agency as
a sufficient subject to warrant a Restatement. 
The First Restatement of Agency, completed in 1933, furnishes an
intriguing test of Professor Natalie Hull’s thesis that the ALI’s founding is
best understood as the product of progressive legal academics who
strategically allied themselves with members of the practicing bar and the
judiciary to pursue legal reform.   In my assessment, the Agency2
Restatement’s signal accomplishment is its coherent articulation of a
systematic scheme that governs a complex body of material, which consists
of the legal concepts and doctrines applicable to consensual relationships in
which one person’s actions carry consequences for the legal position of
another person.  Any society with even a modest degree of complexity
requires intellectual and normative structures through which the consequences
of a representative’s actions or knowledge may be attributed to the person
represented.  Thus, the First Restatement accomplished something of enduring
value, regardless of whether it represented legal reform.  
My inquiry into the agenda of the First Agency Restatement begins with
the First Restatement’s chief personnel, its Reporters.  Their professional and
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3. With one major exception, I rely on published sources. These are richer for part of the relevant time
period because in its early days the ALI published minutes taken at meetings of its Council. I also
reviewed a set of unpublished minutes from meetings of the Agency Restatement’s Advisers
spanning May 1927 through March 1933. This set of minutes)carbon copies on onion-skin
paper)belonged to Judge John Kimberly Beach, who became an Adviser to the project in 1927. In
1940, the set made its way from Judge Beach’s estate into the library collection at Yale Law School.
See infra notes 45–50, 58, and 64.
4. Report of the Executive Committee of the Council on Organization, Work and Budget Adopted May
5, Considered by the Council May 19, 1 A.L.I. PROC., Part III app. 2 at 97–98 (1923).
5. Id. at 98.
6. Id.
7. See FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY: INCLUDING NOT ONLY A DISCUSSION
OF THE GENERAL SUBJECT BUT ALSO SPECIAL CHAPTERS ON ATTORNEYS AUCTIONEERS BROKERS
AND FACTORS (2d ed. 1914) [hereinafter MECHEM, 2d ed.]. The work contains a total of 2176 pages
in two volumes. Mechem was also the author of a casebook and an outline on agency. See FLOYD R.
MECHEM, CASES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY (1898); FLOYD R. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF
personal biographies help understand how they understood and performed the
work that the Restatement required.  The Reporters confronted and
surmounted a fundamental challenge: constructing and defending the identity
of Agency itself as a subject of legal scholarship.  Against this background I
consider salient points in the development of the Restatement’s text: the work
of the Reporters; their collaborations with the ALI’s Director, the project’s
Advisers, and Reporters for other contemporary Restatement projects; actions
taken by the ALI’s Council; and the culminating debate by the ALI’s members
at Annual Meetings.   Valuable though the first Agency Restatement proved3
to be, it explicitly adopted)and its Reporters explicitly defended)a number of
common-law rules that were characterized as unsound, outdated or, in extreme
instances, “barbarous” and “shocking.”  This outcome is not surprising once
it’s assessed against the relevant human and institutional circumstances.   
 
II.  THE REPORTERS: THE “MAN WHO KNEW ALL THE CASES” AND
HIS SUCCESSOR, THE MAN ON THE FLYING MERKLE
In 1923, the Executive Committee of the American Law Institute’s
Council characterized Floyd Russell Mechem, a law professor at the
University of Chicago, as the “one person pre-eminently fitted” to serve as the
Reporter for the Agency Restatement.   Mechem had taught the subject for4
over thirty years.   His treatise was “accorded an authority by the Courts5
unequalled, if indeed equalled to that accorded to any other legal treatise.”6
Indeed, the second edition of Mechem’s treatise on common-law agency,
published in 1914, remains the last treatise on the subject in the United States
of comparable scope and depth.   Mechem’s scholarship was not limited to7
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AGENCY (2d ed. 1903).
As it happens, agency-law scholarship in England has sustained a well-regarded continuing treatise,
presently in its eighteenth edition. See FRANCIS M.B. REYNOLDS, BOWSTEAD AND REYNOLDS ON
AGENCY (Sweet & Maxwell 2006) (1896). The first edition (solely authored by William Bowstead)
was published in 1896.
8. See FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICE AND PUBLIC OFFICERS (1890).
Mechem also published a law-journal article on primary-election legislation that continues to be
influential. See Floyd R. Mechem, Constitutional Limitations on Primary Election Legislation, 3
MICH. L. REV. 364 (1905), cited in, e.g., Benjamin Handler, Abandoning the Cause: An Interstate
Comparison of Candidate Withdrawal and Replacement Laws, 37 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 413,
415 n.12 (2004); Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 28, 107 n.326 (2004) (characterizing Mechem’s article as the “classic . . . on mandatory
primary laws”). 
9. See FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY (1901).
10. See ROBERT HUTCHINSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CARRIERS: AS ADMINISTERED IN THE COURTS
OF THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND (Floyd R. Mechem ed., 2d ed. 1891).
11. See FLOYD R. MECHEM, CASES ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES: SELECTED FROM DECISIONS OF ENGLISH
AND AMERICAN COURTS (West 1895).
12. See FLOYD R. MECHEM, CASES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (1896). Mechem also published a
shorter work on partnership. See FLOYD R. MECHEM, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP
(1896).
13. See FLOYD R. MECHEM, CASES ON THE LAW OF SUCCESSION TO PROPERTY AFTER THE DEATH OF THE
OWNER (1895).
14. Recent illustrative examples include Jennifer Mullenbach, Third Party Logistics Companies and
Legal Liability for Personal Injuries: Where Does the Injured Motorist’s Road to Recovery Lead,
33 TRANSP. L.J. 145, 150 n.28 (Fall/Spring 2005–2006) (citing FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 707–08 (2d ed. 1914); Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to
Remove a Federal Judge, 116 YALE L. J. 72, 127 n.213 (2006) (citing Floyd R. Mechem, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES AND PUBLIC OFFICERS 287 & n.3 (1890)); and Ramon
Casadesus-Mansell & Daniel F. Spulber, Trust and Incentives in Agency, 15 S. CAL INTERDISC. L.
J. 45, 63 n.60 (2005) (citing FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 14 (2d ed.
1914) as “a classic exposition of the various duties and liabilities in agency law”)).
15. See Dorothy E. Finnegan, Raising and Leveling the Bar: Standards, Access, and the YMCA Evening
Law Schools, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 208, 215 (2005). Professor Finnegan credits the Detroit College
with a credible claim to be the first YMCA law school. See id. The College’s institutional history
characterizes Mechem, prior to his appointment as the College’s dean, as “an educator for many
years at the University of Michigan School of Law.” GWENN BASHARA SAMUEL, THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS ARE THE HARDEST: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE DETROIT COLLEGE OF LAW
4 (1992). Mechem does not appear on the faculty rolls for Michigan until 1892, which suggests his
agency.  His published works also include treatises on public offices and
public officers,  sales of personal property,  and the law of carriers,  plus8 9 10
casebooks on the law of damages,  partnership,  and post-mortem succession11 12
to property.   Despite their vintage, several of Mechem’s works continue to13
be cited as authoritative by contemporary scholars.14
Born in 1858, Mechem worked as a practicing lawyer in Detroit until
enlisted into service in 1891 as the founding Dean of the Detroit College of
Law, an institution that originated with the desire of law “readers” in city
firms for a more formal educational experience.   Mechem left Detroit15
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earlier association did not entail a formal Regents’ appointment. See ELIZABETH GASPAR BROWN,
LEGAL EDUCATION AT MICHIGAN 1859–1959, at 469 (1959). At Detroit College, Mechem taught at
night and wrote during the days. His courses included Elementary Law, Real Property, Domestic
Relations, Bailments and Sales, and Agency. SAMUEL, supra at 12.   
16. See BROWN, supra note 15, at 77.  Mechem served as the first faculty editor of the Michigan Law
Review, founded in 1902, for the one year preceding his departure for Chicago. Id. at 330–33.  
17. Id. at 469.
18. See FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY: INCLUDING NOT ONLY A DISCUSSION
OF THE GENERAL SUBJECT BUT ALSO SPECIAL CHAPTERS ON ATTORNEYS, AUCTIONEERS, BROKERS
AND FACTORS (1st ed.1889).
19. Report of the Executive Committee of the Council on Organization, Work and Budget Adopted May
5, Considered by the Council May 19, 1 A.L.I. PROC., Part III app. 2, at 98 (1923).
20. Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the Council, 2 A.L.I. PROC. 241 (1924) (Dec. 5–7, 1924) (report
of Director Lewis).
21. George W. Wickersham, Address of the President, 7 A.L.I. PROC. 33 (1928–1929).
22. Id. at 43.
College in 1892 to become the Tappan professor of law at the University of
Michigan. The University’s Regents approved Mechem’s appointment subject
to provisos that he “not practice in the Courts, and that he reside in Ann
Arbor.”   He departed in 1903 to join the University of Chicago’s newly-16
established law school.   Some of Mechem’s scholarly publications preceded17
his academic career, in particular the first edition of his treatise on agency.18
When appointed Reporter, Professor Mechem was sixty-five years old.
His age made likely either his complete retirement from teaching or a
substantial reduction in that activity.   The magnitude and novelty of the19
projects undertaken by Mechem and his colleagues among the first set of
Reporters justified concern about competing claims on a Reporter’s time and
energies. Even a scholar as knowledgeable as Mechem confronted substantial
challenges in formulating a text that stated legal principles concisely and used
concepts and terminology consistently, both internally to Agency and across
the Restatements as a whole.  Mechem’s work also required substantial travel
and attendance at meetings)each extending over several days)with his
project’s Advisers and others.  Mechem’s work on the Restatement was
interrupted by eye trouble and the necessity for rest.  20
Mechem died on December 11, 1928. The Institute’s President, George
W. Wickersham, eulogized him at the 1929 Annual Meeting as “a man of
simple, strong and lovable character. . . . ”   At the same meeting, the21
Institute’s Director, William Draper Lewis, stated that despite his age,
Mechem “threw himself into his difficult task with that nervous energy which
had enabled him to accomplish so much during his professional career.”    22
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23. Mechem’s death mid-stream may explain why some scholarly accounts misidentify Seavey as the
initial Reporter for Agency. See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE  24
(1995); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 14 (1986).
24. Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Council, 2 A.L.I. PROC. 174 (1923–1924) (Feb. 22, 1924).
25. WARREN A. SEAVEY & DONALD B. KING, A HARVARD LAW SCHOOL PROFESSOR: WARREN A.
SEAVEY’S LIFE AND THE WORLD OF LEGAL EDUCATION 29 (2005).
26. See N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: IN SEARCH OF AN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 6 (1997) (characterizing Pound as “an intuitive networker” who offered patronage
to junior scholars); id. at 54 (Pound’s recruitment of Walter Wheeler Cook to Nebraska); and id. at
99 (Pound’s efforts to further the reputation of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld). 
Seavey himself, like many (most?) successful academics, became central to his own network of
intellectual influence and personal sponsorship. For an example, see William L. Prosser, Warren
Seavey, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1338 (1966). Prosser credits Seavey with suggesting his name to the West
Publishing Company as an author of a hornbook on torts. Seavey then critiqued each draft, writing
“long, detailed, and very astute letters pointing out the errors of innocent ignorance, and suggesting
additions, deletions, changes in language and arrangement, objections, theories, ideas, new lines of
thought, questions, and gentle and obviously sound criticism.” Id. Prosser characterizes Seavey as
“one of a dynasty of torts men . . . .” Id.  
27. A colleague of Seavey, Louis Loss, reports that Scott was Seavey’s closest friend on the Harvard
faculty. See LOUIS LOSS, ANECDOTES OF A SECURITIES LAWYER 76 (1995). For more on the
relationship between Scott and Seavey, see infra note 32.
28. SEAVEY & KING, supra note 25, at 29.
29. Id.at 30.
Warren Abner Seavey succeeded Mechem as Reporter.   He joined the23
Agency project in 1924 as an adviser to Mechem.   Seavey, then a law24
professor at the University of Nebraska, was forty-four years old.  He moved
to the Nebraska faculty from Indiana University thanks to the intervention of
a mentor at Harvard Law School, Roscoe Pound, who endorsed Seavey to
Nebraska’s chancellor.   Seavey, who had not been Pound’s student, joined25
a network of Pound’s protegés, all linked through Pound’s sponsorship.26
Seavey credited Pound (formerly the law dean at Nebraska), among
others, with much help during the early and peripatetic phase of his long
academic career.  Soon after graduating from Harvard Law School, Seavey
began teaching law with three years’ service at Pey Yang University, where
he taught American law to Chinese students.  When he returned to the United
States in 1911, Joseph Beale notified him of a one-year opportunity at Harvard
Law School to teach Pleading as a replacement for Austin Scott.   Seavey,27
who claims in his memoir to have known little about the subject, reports that
he “tried to get help from the faculty, but only one had the knowledge and
willingness . . . . That was Roscoe Pound, a large-bodied Nebraskan.”   Beale28
next cautioned Seavey against accepting an appointment at the University of
Alabama, “where he said I would not get along,” leading Seavey to choose
instead the new law school at the University of Oklahoma.   He traveled from29
Cambridge to Norman by motorcycle, a Flying Merkle.  A few years later,
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30. Id. at 33.
31. Seavey’s Army service led to his appointment as “Advisor for Veterans” at Harvard Law School
during and in the aftermath of World War II. Seavey wrote individual responses, “usually in
longhand,” to inquiries from men in military service, replying that “‘[y]ou are just the sort of man
we are looking for. When you are released from the service, come to Cambridge and we will admit
you.” ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, OULD FIELDS, NEW CORNE: THE PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF A TWENTIETH
CENTURY LAWYER 156 n.6 (1992). Harvard’s dean at the time reports that “[t]here were several
hundred letters of this generous tone. We honored all of them. We called them ‘Seavey estoppels.’”
Id. 
32. Seavey spoke of his treatise-free state as a blessing, telling his colleague Louis Loss)author of a
magisterial treatise on securities regulation) that “[o]nce you produce a treatise, you are a slave to
it for the rest of your life. That’s why I have never written a treatise.” LOSS, supra note 27, at 76.
What prompted Seavey’s assertion was Loss’s complaint about the burdens of updating and revising
his treatise. Seavey told Loss he’d made “the same mistake Scott made.” Id. Seavey’s colleague)and
co-Reporter for the Restatement of Restitution)Austin W. Scott was the author of the multi-volume
Scott on Trusts, as well as the Reporter for the Restatement of Trusts. When Loss next had a
conversation with Scott that turned to Seavey, Scott said: “ Seavey is very good. But, you know, he’s
not first-rate; he has never produced a treatise.” Id.
33. See WARREN A. SEAVEY, CASES ON AGENCY (1945); LIVINGSTON HALL, HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN
& WARREN A. SEAVEY, CASES ON AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP (1962); WARREN A. SEAVEY, AGENCY
(1964). Seavey also published on Torts. See WARREN A. SEAVEY & EDWARD S. THURSTON, CASES
ON TORTS (1942); WARREN A. SEAVEY, COGITATIONS ON TORTS (1954).
34. See WARREN A. SEAVEY, STUDIES IN AGENCY (1949). Seavey’s Studies also includes otherwise-
unpublished note material from four tentative drafts (nos. 4–7) of the first Restatement, written by
Seavey after he became Reporter. See id. at iii, 203–414. 
35. See supra text accompanying note 15.
when Seavey exited Oklahoma after a disagreement with his dean,  Pound
recommended Seavey for an appointment at Tulane.   Seavey joined the30
Indiana faculty after service in the Army during World War I.   After one31
year at the University of Pennsylvania, he joined Harvard Law School’s
faculty in 1928.  
His relative youth was not the sole characteristic that differentiated
Seavey from Mechem. Unlike Mechem, Seavey published no comprehensive
treatise.   His books on agency consisted of casebooks, a hornbook,  and a32 33
collection of his law-journal articles.   Moreover, the two Reporters had34
intriguingly different sets of professional experiences.  Seavey’s time in law
practice was very brief)in contrast to Mechem’s ) and not happy.  As Seavey35
recounted his experiences following his second year in law school:
I got a job with a two-man firm, Joslin and Mendrum, whose office was in
Scollay Square, Boston.  I got $10 a week and learned a little about where to
file papers.  The following year they needed to save money and I was
dropped. 
I retired to a little office suite next door with its window on the air shaft . . .
There I picked up a scanty living by collecting bills with some help from my
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36. See SEAVEY & KING, supra note 25, at 9–10. Id. Seavey’s father worked in Boston as a teamster. Id.
at 1. As a teenager, during summers Seavey drove one of his father’s market wagons, delivering
produce for a commission merchant from the Faneuil Hall market, a business activity that constituted
his father’s principal source of income. Id. at 2. 
37. See LOSS, supra note 27, at 69.  
38. Id. at 19. Loss reports that Archibald Cox was also especially fond of Seavey, with Loss and Cox
“repairing to [Seavey’s] office quite often for discussions not only of Agency and the problems to
be considered in the next class, but also of life.” Id. Seavey’s generosity to colleagues extended to
finances. When Seavey first met Loss, he lent him the money he needed for a down payment on a
house and then refused to accept interest on the amount when Loss repaid it. See id. at 19–20. Seavey
also lent money to Erwin Griswold to enable him to buy the lot adjoining his house and again refused
to take interest. See GRISWOLD, supra note 31, at 131. 
39. See SEAVEY & KING, supra note 25.
40. Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the Council, 2 A.L.I. PROC. 243 (1923–1924) (Dec. 5–7, 1924).
41. Minutes of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Meetings of the Council, 5 A.L.I. PROC. 43 (1927) (May
11, 1927).
42. Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Council, 2 A.L.I. PROC. 200
(1923–1924) (June 20, 1924).
43. SEAVEY & KING, supra note 25, at 55. Powell was later to criticize Tentative Draft No. 1 at the 1926
Annual Meeting (“there are some matters in this Restatement which need change . . . .”). Floyd R.
Mechem, Discussion of the Tentative Draft, Agency Restatement No. 1, 4 app. A.L.I. PROC. 145
(1926). The immediate focus of Powell’s criticism was a definition of “independent contractor” that
differentiated an independent contractor from a “servant” on the basis of possession of the right to
control the actor’s work. Instead, Powell argued, the correct test was broader: “whose business was
father, but had little success in picking up clients.  I refused to be again a
clerk in a law office, but I had doubts as to how long I could keep going.  36
Seavey’s professional life centered on work within law schools, as he moved
from one to another early on and then returned to Harvard for a long run.  He
thrived as a teacher of the law; his colleague Louis Loss characterized him as
“probably the country’s greatest master of the Socratic dialog.”   He was37
supportive of his colleagues, including junior members of the faculty, like
Loss, who were assigned to teach sections of the required first-year course on
Agency.   Seavey was blessed with a long life and recounted it in a38
posthumously-published memoir, a happy coincidence of circumstances that
inevitably makes him a more vivid character than Mechem.    39
Seavey’s role in the Agency Restatement project expanded with time.
Although no Assistant to the Reporter was believed necessary in 1924,  by40
1927 Seavey had been designated Mechem’s Assistant.   That formality41
appears to have acknowledged the dominant role that  Seavey occupied among
Mechem’s advisers as well as the substantiality of his contributions to the
project.  For example, although both Seavey and Richard R. Powell were
asked to prepare commentary and illustrations for Mechem’s first draft
(consisting of 115 sections),  Seavey reports that Mechem took his42
illustrations “exclusively.”43
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being done,” a determination that required assessing “all the circumstances of the case.” Id. at 146.
In 1927, Powell became an Adviser to the Property Restatement. 5 A.L.I. PROC. 7 (1927) (minutes
of Council’s Executive Committee, Feb. 24, 1927). Powell succeeded Harry Bigelow as the Reporter
for Property in 1929 when Bigelow became Dean of the University of Chicago’s Law School. See
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 50  ANNIVERSARY 125 (1973). T H
44. Reliable secondary authority reports that it was Seavey’s habit to address Lewis as “‘Dear
Commander’” in letters [sic] to him. See Michael Traynor, The President’s Letter, 29 ALI REPORTER
1, 2 (Winter 2007). Lewis’s successor as Director, Herbert Goodrich, characterized Lewis as “a hard
worker, partly because he did everything the hard way. Sometimes he would write two or three
longhand drafts before he tried a typewritten copy. All his procedures were elaborate, accurate and
slow.” Herbert F. Goodrich, The Story of the American Law Institute 1923–1961, 1951 WASH. U.
L. Q. 283, 285 (1951). Goodrich also credits Lewis with “one of the warmest personalities that
anyone could have the privilege to work with.” Id.
45. For example, reacting to a draft Agency provision on integrated contracts, Lewis stated that “if in the
comment or black letter we are going to deal here with substantially the same problem that is being
dealt with by the contract group, . . . in re-writing this you, the Reporter. consider what has been done
or is being done by the contract group so that we will avoid any slightly different way of putting the
matter.” See American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Agency, Minutes of Meetings of
Conferences of Reporters and Advisers, Oct. 30, 1927, at 9 (hereinafter Advisers’ Minutes). Lewis
suggested co-ordinating Agency’s definition of “interests” with usage in Torts and Property
Restatements, Id., July 18, 1929, at 46–47. At the same meeting, he noted that compared to other
Restatement projects, Agency’s usage of “notice” “had produced considerable heaviness . . . because
it forced a repetition of the expression ‘knowledge, reason to know and notice’, and he, therefore, had
felt for some time that there would be an advantage in having one word which would mean any or
all of those things . . . .”  Id., July 19, 1927, at 55–56. 
46. See, e.g., Advisers’ Minutes, Oct.10, 1930, at 15 (Reporter will see Samuel Williston concerning
provision on liability of obligor on negotiable instrument in action brought by agent); Mar. 20, 1931,
at 6 (Adviser suggests Reporter question Austin Scott concerning trustee liability when trustee
accepts a bribe from a brokerage firm); Sept. 1, 1931, at 26 (Reporter to see Williston concerning
statements about bilateral and unilateral contracts); June 9, 1932, at 6 (Lewis to write to Harry
Bigelow, Reporter for Property, “and get his written reaction on taking out from the definition of
‘power’ the words ‘on the part’, ‘to produce’, and the word ‘given’ before ‘legal relations’”). Other
Despite their centrality as Reporters, Mechem and Seavey were not solely
responsible for the work required to produce the Restatement.  Their Advisers,
who reviewed successive drafts as the project progressed, contributed
extensive comments on substantive points, often proposing revisions to the
Reporter’s formulations.  Advisers’ meetings progressed section-by-section,
each specifically approved or returned to the Reporter for revisions.  The
Director, William Draper Lewis, occupied many roles in these meetings,
focusing more than any other participant on maintaining overall coherence
among the various Restatements.   Lewis participated actively, sometimes44
instructing the Reporter to consult another project to confirm or co-ordinate
how a substantive issue or a question of terminology would be resolved or
otherwise expressing concern for co-ordination among projects.   The Agency45
meetings identified specific questions for referral to Reporters from other
projects.   Other projects’ Reporters occasionally attended Agency46
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Reporters’ reactions were reported back to the Agency group. For example, Lewis relayed Williston’s
opposition to substituting “unless otherwise understood” for “unless otherwise agreed” in the Agency
Draft. Id., Aug. 31, 1931, at 1.   
47. For examples of substantive contributions by Reporters for other projects, see, e.g., Advisers’
Minutes, Apr. 28, 1928, at 2 (Francis Bohlen, Reporter for Torts, questions whether entrusting
instrumentalities to a servant warrants treatment as a separate basis for master’s liability); June 9,
1932, at 14 (Austin Scott, Reporter for Trusts, proposes definition of “notice” with which Lewis
agrees; under Scott’s definition, “a person has notice of a fact if he has knowledge of it, reason to
know of it, or a situation exists in which he should know of it, or if notification has been given him”).
The substance of Scott’s suggested definition of “notice” was subsequently adopted. See id., Sept.
4, 1932, at 26.   
48. See Advisers’ Minutes, June 9, 1932, at 2 (Lewis to write comment “stating that the control of the
principal is implicit in the understanding of the parties regardless of what they may verbally manifest
to each other; that where this implicit understanding does not exist it is not an agency relationship,
but something else”). Seavey was to write a comment on the other defining element, that an agent
assents to “act on behalf of the other.” Id. at 3.
49. Advisers’ Minutes, Oct. 21, 1928, at 27.
50. Id. at 28–29 (statement of Calvert Magruder).
meetings.   Toward the Agency project’s end, Lewis undertook primary47
responsibility for drafting the commentary addressing a principal’s power to
control the agent, one of the defining elements of an agency relationship.48
Moments of apparent levity punctuated the seriousness of the Advisers’
meetings. Consider the following hypothetical, it would seem
extemporaneously posed by Mechem to illustrate the difficulties in
determining when an agent’s disloyal motive should terminate the agent’s
power to bind the principal:
If I say to Mr. Lewis “Seavey is my agent to borrow money” and Seavey goes
to Mr. Lewis and borrows money, having made up his mind beforehand that
he is going to borrow the money on his own account and not on mine at all,
there I think I am liable. The second case is this. I tell Seavey, and I never tell
Mr. Lewis, that Seavey is my agent and Seavey goes to Lewis. Lewis has had
no communication with me and I have had no communication with him.
Seavey goes to him and he says falsely: “I am coming to you as Mechem’s
agent. He wants to borrow $10,000.” The fact is that he is acting as a
wrongdoer taking advantage of the situation to fleece somebody out of
$10,000. Mr. Lewis lets him have the $10,000 relying on what he says about
the situation . . . Seavey goes off with the money. May Lewis recover of
me?   49
The consensus answer to Mechem’s question was no, one Adviser observing:
“[i]f in fact the agent was not acting for his principal, I do not see that it is
essentially different from any other case of a crook going into a bank and
falsely representing that he is the agent of John D. Rockefeller.”  50
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51. Warren A. Seavey, Discussion of Agency Tentative Draft No. 4, 7 A.L.I. PROC. 233 (1929).
52. Floyd R. Mechem, Discussion of the Tentative Draft, Agency Restatement No. 1, 4 app. A.L.I. PROC.
142 (1926).
53. Id. at 141.
54. Id. at 143–44.
55. Id. at 139 (Section 2 in Tentative Draft No. 1).
56. RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1933).
57. Floyd R. Mechem, Discussion of the Tentative Draft, Agency Restatement No. 1, 4 app. A.L.I. PROC.
150–52 (1926).
In his first appearance before an Annual Meeting as the new Reporter for
Agency, Seavey lauded Mechem as “a man who knew all the cases.”   What51
Seavey knew)or soon learned)was how to draft black-letter formulations in
a simplified and clarified fashion, in contrast with Mechem’s more diffuse and
general style.  Mechem’s style may have stemmed from his comprehensive
knowledge of the cases and his life’s work detailing them in his treatise.
Mechem himself acknowledged to the 1926 Annual Meeting that his work had
been criticized for “too many words.”   The formulation that evoked this52
admission was section 3: 
When the person acting is to represent the other in contractual negotiations,
bargainings or transactions involved in business dealings with third persons,
or is to appear for or represent the other in hearings or proceedings in which
he may be interested, he is termed an ‘agent,’ and the person for whom he is
to act is termed the ‘principal.’53
Mechem’s diffuse formulations were misleading. A member noted that
“business dealings” in section 3 appeared to require a series of transactions or
dealings, and that “business” appeared too narrow, given the breadth of
actions an agent might take on behalf of a principal.54
Moreover, some of Mechem’s formulations were conclusory.  For
example, Mechem’s drafting in Tentative Draft No. 1 defined “the relation of
Agency” as “the consensual relation existing between two persons, by virtue
of which one of them is to act for and on behalf of the other and subject to his
control.”   This formulation does not state the mechanism through which such55
a “relation” comes into existence.  By 1933, the counterpart language in the
final Restatement’s first section made the mechanism explicit: “the
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on
his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.”56
Inconsistencies in Mechem’s drafting style)in particular, in usage of “power”
and “authority”)provoked an extensive dissection from the floor of the 1926
Annual Meeting by Arthur L. Corbin.   Mechem had also used the word57
“ability” at points, thereby, as Corbin pointed out, implying a conclusion
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58. Id. at 151. Discussion at a later Advisers’ meeting focused on difficulties created by “ability.” In the
context of how “authority” should be defined and how manifestations from principal to agent should
be interpreted, Lewis pressed Mechem on whether “ability” and “power’ were synonyms. See
Advisers’ Minutes, supra note 45, May 27, 1927, at 2–3. Seavey professed not to understand
Mechem’s draft)“I don’t understand that at all”)prompting Mechem to rejoin) “I don’t believe you.”
Id. at 3. The basic drafting challenges stemmed from acknowledging that a principal’s manifestation
may not be fully detailed and that circumstances may change between the time of the principal’s
manifestation and the time the agent determines how to act. Seavey advocated distinguishing
between “finding out what the manifestation means” and “the legal effect of that . . . .”  Id. at 11–12.
Mechem, who preferred not to draw this distinction, instead proposed to solve the problem by
deeming the requisite specifics to have been present in the principal’s mind: “I read those back into
the mind of the principal at the time of the act. At the time he manifested his consent, he manifested
consent to do all those usual and ordinary things connected with the doing of the act.” Id. at 10.
Seavey noted that Mechem was using the word “manifestation” in “two different senses. We have
got to get a different word to describe the doing of the first act which gives the general authority to
which we attach these incidents.” Id. at 13. Seavey urged the group to acknowledge (as the draft
eventually did) that “[w]e are dealing with interpretation,” id. at 17, a process not entirely captured
by Mechem’s subjective conception of the deemed contents of a principal’s mind.           
59. William Draper Lewis, Report of the Director, 11 A.L.I. PROC. 40 (1932–1934). Powell is not listed
as an Adviser in the final published volume. See supra notes 42–43.
60. Warren A. Seavey, Discussion of Agency Proposed Final Draft, 11 A.L.I. PROC. 78 (1932–1934).
61. Id. at 79. 
about the impact of an agent’s actions on the principal that might or might not
stem from authority granted by the principal through an expression to the
agent.    58
At the 1933 Annual Meeting, Director William Draper Lewis
characterized the work required to prepare the Proposed Final Draft of the
Agency Restatement as “in truth a labor of Hercules,” impossible without
boundless work by Seavey and his advisers.   Seavey acknowledged the59
transition in style that followed Mechem’s death) “[w]e departed very largely
from the way in which Mr. Mechem had expressed himself”)while we
“departed scarcely ever from the result which Mr. Mechem reached.”  60
At points, though, Mechem’s formulations required later departures by
Seavey and his team as a consequence of the substantive implications of
earlier formulations for questions addressed downstream as the project
progressed.  For example, Mechem defined apparent authority as an agent’s
power to affect the principal’s legal relations only when the principal’s
manifestations to a third party concerning the agent’s authority differed from
those made to the agent.   But when Seavey and his team reached the61
consequences of a principal’s termination of an agent’s authority, it became
evident that Mechem’s requirement of divergent manifestations to agent and
third party excluded the well-known possibility that an agent might appear to
continue to have authority following the principal’s manifestation of
28 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 32
62. Id.
63. Id. Section 8 defines “apparent authority” as “the power of an apparent agent to affect the legal
relations of an apparent principal with respect to a third person by acts done in accordance with such
principal’s manifestations of consent to the third party that such agent shall act as his agent.”
Comment a acknowledges that authority may or may not be co-extensive with apparent authority.
Seavey characterized apparent authority as analogous to “an offer made by the principal to a third
person . . . .”  Id. at 80. This is potentially a much narrower definition than might follow from a
“manifestation” made by the principal to a third party.
64. See Advisers’ Minutes, supra note 45, Oct. 21, 1928, at 45.
65. Id. What provoked this statement was a group of cases subjecting a principal to liability on an
instrument when making the contract was not within the agent’s actual or apparent authority.
Mechem believed the principle supported by the cases was “not a statement of the law of Agency . . .
even though it might be expressed somewhere in the Restatement of the Law of Agency.” Id. at 44.
An Adviser, Calvert Magruder, replied that failing to treat the cases as an agency-law exception to
a more general rule would make the statement of the general rule misleading: “It does not seem
sufficient to say that the liability is based on a principle of the law of bills and notes. If you subtract
from the operative facts of the relationship the existence of the Agency relationship, the defendant
would not be liable.” Id. Magruder acknowledged that “considerations of policy as to the free
negotiability of these instruments are taken into account” in determining liability. Id.   
termination to the agent when the third party lacked notice of it.62
Acknowledging the possibility of lingering apparent authority then
necessitated revising Mechem’s much earlier definition of apparent authority
and making clear that actual and apparent authority may often co-exist.    63
More generally, Seavey appears to have tackled the challenges of drafting
having asked broader questions than Mechem tended to do.  The consequences
of this difference extended well beyond drafting itself.  Seavey and Mechem
differed on how Agency itself should best be defined as a subject.  Seavey,
according to Lewis, drew lines of demarcation by asking a general question
regardless of the specific topic or issue: 
Supposing that in the chain of circumstances an agency did not exist, would
the law be as it is? Would the result in a concrete case be as it is? Whenever
Agency is one of the operative facts which lead to the legal result, then it is
part of the law of Agency.64
Lewis reported that Mechem “has a somewhat narrower conception” but did
not state its content.65
III.  ANSWERING POUND’S QUESTION AND HOLMES’S
CHALLENGE
Floyd Mechem introduced Tentative Draft No. 1 to the 1926 Annual
Meeting on a note that may seem incongruously diffident, given Mechem’s
unquestioned preeminence as an authoritative scholar.  Mechem’s diffidence
2007] The First Restatement of Agency 29
66. Floyd R. Mechem, Discussion of the Tentative Draft, Agency Restatement No. 1, 4 app. A.L.I. PROC.
134 (1926).
67. Id.
68. See Roscoe Pound, Preliminary Report to the Council on the Classification of the Law, 2 A.L.I.
PROC. 379–425 (1923–1924). A portion of Pound’s scheme, not including his question concerning
Agency, was published as Roscoe Pound, A Classification of Law, 37 HARV. L. REV. 933 (1924).
69. Roscoe Pound, Preliminary Report to the Council on the Classification of the Law, 2 A.L.I. PROC.
423 (1923–1924).
70. Id. at 86 (minutes of Council meeting, Feb. 23, 1924). The Council’s earlier application for funding
to the Carnegie Corporation characterized Agency as “a fundamental legal relation” that “if a suitable
Reporter can be found” . . . “should be undertaken at an early stage of our work.” Report of the
Executive Committee of the Council on Organization, Work and Budget Adopted May 5, Considered
by the Council May 19, 1 A.L.I. PROC., Part III app. 2 at 97–98 (1923). The application noted the
practical advantage of proceeding with work on Contracts, Torts, and Agency at the same time so
that the Reporters could confer with each other. Id.
71. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 180–83 (1923); Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Agency, I, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 345, 350–51 (1891); Agency, II, 5 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1891). 
72. See MECHEM, 2d ed., supra note 7, § 9.
concerned the subject, not his mastery of it.  Said Mechem: “I suppose that
when the Council decided to try to make a Restatement of the law of Agency,
there was some implicit assumption that there is a law of Agency.  I know that
some people deny it, and say there is no law of Agency at all.”   Mechem66
characterized the law of agency as a residuum, its content consisting of
something of a negative space: “Whether there is a law of Agency or not . . .
depends on the question whether there are, on the whole, some things which
you cannot dispose of with the ordinary rules of Contracts and Torts, and such
work as I have done in the field of Agency has led me to believe this was the
case.”  67
Mechem’s diffidence is readily understandable.  Agency’s status had been
questioned by both Roscoe Pound and Oliver Wendell Holmes, presenting a
formidable challenge to the intellectual worth of Mechem’s work in his
treatise as well as his work as Reporter. 
Pound’s challenge was milder than Holmes’s.  The Institute’s Council had
earlier commissioned a report from Roscoe Pound on “Classification of the
Law.”   Agency appeared only at the end of Pound’s report under “Specific68
Questions of Classification.”  The question? “The place of Agency?”   Pound69
ventured no answer.  It’s not surprising that Mechem, at his first meeting with
the Council in 1924, said he found Pound’s question “disquieting.”  70
Holmes, in contrast, claimed that agency-law doctrine rested on nothing
more than a fiction identifying principal and agent, plus common sense.71
Prior to their work on the Restatement, both Mechem and Seavey took on
Holmes, each responding in characteristic fashion.  Mechem’s treatise
contains an early section captioned “Is there a law of agency.”  Mechem’s72
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73. Id. Mechem continued: “That there are some unique cases,)like the rules respecting the undisclosed
principal, for example)cannot be denied; although some have preferred to treat these merely as
anomalies rather than as the subject of a distinct system of rules.” Id.   
74. Warren A. Seavey, The Rationale of Agency, 29 YALE L. J. 859, 859 (1920). At the time, Seavey was
a faculty member at Indiana University. His memoir reports that the Harvard Law Review rejected
his article and that it was the basis for his invitation to work on the Restatement. See SEAVEY &
KING, supra note 25, at 51.
75. Seavey, supra note 74, at 859.
76. Id. 
prolix (but unsurprising) answer is yes: “If . . . there should be found to exist
a respectable body of rules peculiar to this situation, without which its
phenomena could not be satisfactorily explained, then it might fairly be said
that there is a law of agency.”   Seavey’s more aggressive reply came in an73
article published in 1920 in the Yale Law Journal.  In Seavey’s view, if
correct, Holmes’s assertion meant that “[w]e are . . . denied by our belief the
ability to rationalize the subject and relying only on intuition to determine
when and to what extent common sense is to be applied.”   But such74
pessimism is unwarranted: “Justice Holmes overestimates the effect of the
fictions.  On the contrary, I believe that the results reached by the courts can
be explained without using legal presumptions as axioms and that individual
cases may be tested by the use of judicial sense (rather than common sense)
and the needs of commerce.”  Using this base, a scholar may reduce agency-75
law doctrines to their operative elements and proceed with analysis, thereby
“finding the rhyme and reason of the law which has grown on the fertile soil
of a three party relationship.”  76
Seavey’s answer to Holmes was an optimistic assessment of both the
intellectual and the practical merit of legal scholarship focused on agency.
Seavey’s answer also emphasizes the value of inductive methodology in legal
scholarship even when a scholar’s materials consist solely of reported
opinions from appellate courts.  To a contemporary reader, what Seavey
advocates is using an empiricist methodology unconstrained by prior abstract
formulations to generate an organized system of norms that guides the
resolution of disputes toward acceptable conclusions.
Although Seavey’s perspective is not wholly unrelated to the soon-to-
come challenges posed by Legal Realism to orthodox legal scholarship, he
does not appear to have self-identified with scholars associated with Legal
Realism (and neither they nor their chroniclers claim Seavey as a Realist).  
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77. Warren A. Seavey, Discussion of the Restatement of Agency Tentative Draft No. 7, 10 A.L.I. PROC.
318 (1931–1932).
78. Id.
79. Id. The “memory rule,” which survived into Restatement (Second) of Agency, was jettisoned in
Restatement (Third). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05, cmt. c (2006) (“[a]n agent is
not free to use or disclose a principal’s trade secrets or other confidential information whether the
agent retains a physical record of them or retains them in the agent’s memory. If information is
otherwise a trade secret or confidential, the means by which an agent appropriates it for later use or
IV.  RESTATING “THE LAW AS WE FIND IT” AND NOT “WHAT
THE LAW OUGHT TO BE” 
Overall, the accomplishment represented by the first Restatement of
Agency is the rationalization and clarification of legal doctrine in a systematic
fashion, not the fulfilment of a reformist agenda in a more conventional sense.
Whatever Mechem’s and Seavey’s underlying impulses may have been, their
capacity to achieve reform was constrained by the institution of the
Restatement itself.  On the one hand, that institution promised that their work
would carry legitimacy and thus impact but, on the other hand, it
circumscribed what could be done.  This circumscription was enforced by the
Institute itself through its Council and members, as well as through the
Reporters’ own understanding of their project and how it might proceed. 
More specifically, Mechem and Seavey were loathe to generalize without
explicit support drawn from specific cases.  Their lack of boldness may have
set them apart from at least some of their fellow Reporters.  At the 1932
Annual Meeting, a member noted the relative modesty of Mechem and Seavey
in contrast to their colleagues, encouraging Seavey and his advisers to “lay
down the rule which he thinks the courts should adopt rather than try to derive
a rule from the decisions which is not fully developed.”   The member’s77
comment concerned the rule that became section 396, on an agent’s use of
confidential information following termination.  As formulated, the rule
incorporated the “memory rule,” which protected an agent’s post-termination
use of the principal’s confidential information so long as the agent extracted
it solely through memory.  The member objected that this seemed
unprincipled: “The point seems to me to be that if the agent did acquire the
information in the course of his employment and would not have acquired it
otherwise, he should not be permitted to use it merely by retaining [it] in his
memory.”   The member also noted that courts expressed doubt about the78
soundness of the rule.
Seavey replied that he had two options: “To recite what the courts have
decided or to say nothing.”  79
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disclosure should be irrelevant.”).
80. Herbert Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J. 147, 150 (1969). 
81. As Director Wechsler wrote in response to an attack in 1965 by the defense bar on Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A: 
I asked . . . if the statement of a rule does not involve something more than the conclusion
that it is supported by the past decisions, for this is an implicit judgment that our courts
today would not perceive a change in situation calling for the adaptation of the rule or
even for a new departure. And if we ask ourselves what courts will do within an area, can
we divorce our answers wholly from our view of what they ought to do, given the factors
that appropriately influence their judgments, under the prevailing view of the judicial
function?
Id. at 149 
82. See, e.g., Minutes of the Tenth and Eleventh Meetings of the Council, 4 A.L.I. PROC. 18 (1926) (Feb.
26, 1926) (Lewis reports that matters to be covered by Tentative Draft No. 1 “present subjects on
which there is comparatively little conflict and rarely any dearth of authority”).  
83. These included termination of an agent’s authority, see Minutes of the Twenty-Second Meeting of
the Executive Committee of the Council, 4 A.L.I. PROC. 69 (1926) (minutes of Council’s Executive
Committee, Oct. 22, 1926), and liability, see Minutes of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Meetings of
the Council, 6 A.L.I. PROC. 226–27 (1928) (characterizing difficulties as “as great as any we have
had or are likely to have on any subject”). 
84. See Floyd R. Mechem, Discussion of the Tentative Draft, Agency Restatement No. 1, continued, 4
app. A.L.I. PROC. 183 (1926) (weight of authority supports rule that undisclosed principal may not
ratify an agent’s act; rule in Massachusetts to contrary in some circumstances); Warren A. Seavey,
Discussion of Agency Tentative Draft No. 4, 7 A.L.I. PROC. 237 (1929) (overwhelming weight of
authority supports rule that principal is not subject to liability on negotiable or sealed instrument
unless principal appears to be a promisor by terms of instrument).
85. See Warren A. Seavey, Discussion of Agency, Tentative Draft No. 6, 9 A.L.I. PROC. 219–21
(1930–1931) (adopting view, consistent with position in Restatement of Contracts but contrary to
“the majority of decisions,” that bona fide purchaser should be protected as against undisclosed
principal when agent assigns a contract made in the agent’s own name but for the benefit of
principal). 
Seavey’s reply is consistent)but only in part)with what a later ALI
Director, Herbert Wechsler, characterized as the then-prevailing “dogma that
a rule we restate, because we think it would be followed by the courts, may
not be criticized by caveat or comment, however strong the arguments against
it are.”   But did Seavey think a court would follow the “memory rule”?  If80
not, his understanding of his options as Reporter seems unduly constrained
because it ignores any element of prediction, itself a function of how and
whether the rule may be justified.   Thus, even among the first Restatements,81
Agency’s style and texture were narrowly-cast and cautious, not bold.      
To be sure, many of the points covered by the first Restatement were seen
as reflecting no material disagreement among relevant cases.   Other topics82
were acknowledged to be more difficult.   On points at which the cases83
disagreed, the drafters chose one position over another, often  but not84
always  in line with the weight of authority.  And when many cases supported85
opposing positions, the drafters might choose on the basis of the recency of
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86. See, e.g, Floyd R. Mechem, Discussion of the Tentative Draft, Agency Restatement No. 1, continued,
4 app. A.L.I. PROC. 145 (1926) (rule binding principal to notice received by subagent); Warren A.
Seavey, Discussion of Agency Tentative Draft No. 4, 7 A.L.I. Proc. 255–56 (1928–1929)
(undisclosed principal’s payment to or settlement with agent discharges liability when done in
reliance on conduct of third party) .
87. Warren A. Seavey, Discussion of Agency Proposed Final Draft, 11 A.L.I. PROC. 96 (1932–1934).
The doctrine of powers given as security, stated in section 138, enables a grantor to create an
irrevocable power when the power holder does not have a proprietary interest in the subject matter
of the agency and when the power and the proprietary interest are not united in the same person. In
contrast, under Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Hunt v. Rousmanier’s Administrators, a power
of sale does not survive the death of its grantor unless the power holder is vested with an interest or
estate that accompanies the power. See 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 174 (1823). For Seavey’s early critique
of Hunt, see Warren A. Seavey, Termination By Death of Proprietary Powers of Attorney, 31 YALE
L. J. 283 (1922).
88. Warren A. Seavey, Discussion of Agency Proposed Final Draft, 11 A.L.I. PROC. 86 (1932–1934).
89. Id.
90. Id.
decisions or the identity of the court.   The Restatement also did what it could86
to correct the erroneous impression created by Chief Justice Marshall that a
power held as security did not differ from an ordinary agency power and was
thus just as fragile, terminable on all the bases applicable to ordinary agency
relationships, including the grantor’s death.  87
That the Agency Restatement would not serve as an engine of broader-
reaching reform became most sharply evident at the 1933 Annual Meeting.
The Proposed Final Draft (Seavey’s “labor of Hercules”) called the members’
specific attention to particular sections.  Among these was § 120, dealing with
the impact of a principal’s death.  As stated in section 120, “[t]he death of the
principal terminates the authority of the agent.”  Seavey acknowledged that
the rule meant that following the principal’s death, the agent has a duty not to
act on the principal’s behalf.   If the fact of the principal’s death is notorious,88
the agent (and third parties with whom the agent deals) will be aware of it.
But suppose neither the agent nor the third party with whom the agent deals
has notice of the principal’s death.  Said Seavey: “The agent is in a
dilemma)to act or not to act.  If he acts and his principal is dead, he is
liable.”   That is, the agent is liable to the third party because the agent has89
breached the agent’s implied warranty of authority that his actions will bind
the principal.  The agent, having acted without actual authority, will also
jeopardize rights to compensation and indemnity otherwise owed by the
principal.  And, continued Seavey: “If he does not act and his principal is
alive, he is liable.”   That’s because the agent’s duty is to act for the principal90
during the principal’s lifetime. 
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91. Id. at 79. 
92. Id. at 90.
93. Id. at 91. Two decades later, Seavey’s colleagues Henry Hart and Albert Sacks cited this incident as
establishing the ALI’s deference to the “‘necessary’ implications of existing decisions,” thereby
casting itself in the “role of only a follower in the statement of the law and of a follower, moreover,
willing to join the parade only after it was well underway.” HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 761 (Tent.
ed. 1958)
94. The Caveat read: “No inference is to be drawn from the rule stated in this section that an agent does
not have power to bind the estate of a deceased principal in transactions dependent upon a special
relationship between the agent and the principal, such as that of banker and depositor, or trustee and
cestui que trust, or in transactions in which special rules are applicable, as in dealings with negotiable
instruments.” 
95. Warren A. Seavey, Discussion of Agency Proposed Final Draft, 11 A.L.I. PROC. 86, 94 (1932–34).
When the question first came to the Council, Mechem acknowledged the absence of cases contrary
to the rule. Id. at 88. This is consistent with the conclusion Mechem reached in his treatise that “[t]he
overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect that the death of the principal operates as an
instantaneous revocation of the agency when it is a naked power unaccompanied with an interest
. . . .”  MECHEM, 2d ed., supra note 7, § 665, at 474. At the 1933 Annual Meeting, Director Lewis
stated that “[t]hat did not represent at the time the view of many of those who believed that in
restating the law as it is we should not state it in the archaic way.” Warren A. Seavey, Discussion of
Agency Proposed Final Draft, 11 A.L.I. PROC. 94 (1932–1934). Lewis noted that Seavey would have
preferred to formulate the black letter so that the principal’s death terminates the agent’s authority
when the agent has notice of it and urged the members to consider this possibility. Id. at 88–89.
Seavey’s position is consistent with Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.07(2) (2006), under which,
as against an agent, the principal’s death is effective to terminate the agent’s actual authority when
the agent has notice of the death. Seavey’s preferred rule was also consistent with statutes in some
states, see infra note 101, and with a small number of cases, noted in Mechem’s treatise, see
MECHEM, 2d ed., supra note 7, § 664 n. 69. 
Seavey said the agent’s resulting dilemma was “to many of us, a very
shocking result.”   One member characterized the black letter as “a relic of91
remote barbarism”  and argued that the absoluteness with which the black92
letter was formulated represented “an impediment on the course of the
progress of jurisprudence,” urging that the black letter be followed by a
comment of disapproval by the Institute.   Instead, the draft before the93
meeting attached a caveat to section 120, noting existing exceptions to the rule
(i.e. in dealings involving negotiable instruments) and stating that “[n]o
inference is to be drawn . . . that an agent does not have power to bind the
estate of a deceased principal” in such instances.   The house voted to94
approve the section as drafted with the caveat upon the motion of a member
who said: “We ought to state and our object is to state the law we find it . . .
there is no justification for our attempt to depart in any manner from the law
as we find it or to speculate what the law ought to be.”  95
As it happens, Director Lewis’s work two decades earlier in codifying and
reforming partnership law provides an interesting counterpoint on the same
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96. See William Draper Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YALE L. J. 617, 638 (1915).
97. Id. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 34, 7 U.L.A. 190 (1949). 
98. Warren A. Seavey, Discussion of Agency Proposed Final Draft, 11 A.L.I. PROC. 90 (1932–1934).
99. Lewis, supra note 96, at 620.
100. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT, 7 U.L.A., at xv (1949).
101. The Commissioner’s Note to section 34 may reflect confusion about the then-current state of
common-law agency doctrine. The Note states that the common-law rule has been modified in some
states in the agency context. Four of the domestic statutes cited as authority for this proposition
support it while one does not. Cal. Civ. Code § 2356 as it stood in 1914 (and 1933, for that matter)
provided that when an agent’s power was not coupled with an interest, a set of events, including the
principal’s death, would terminate the power. Cal. Civ. Code § 2356 (Deering 1886). Section 2356
was amended in 1943 to add what’s now subsection (b). It provides that “any bona fide transaction
entered into with an agent by any person acting without actual knowledge of the revocation, death
or incapacity [of the principal] shall be binding on the principal, his or her heirs, devisees, legatees,
and other successors in interest.” Other statutes cited in the Commissioner’s Note state a notice or
knowledge rule. See La. Civ. Code § 3032 (transactions are valid when agent who is ignorant of
principal’s death who continues to act under power of attorney) (2d ed. 1913); Md. Rev. Code art.
44, § 31 (1879) (dealings by agent acting under power of attorney or other agency binding
notwithstanding death of principal when person who dealt with agent lacked notice of death); N.D.
Civ. Code § 1150 (1899) (employment in which power not coupled with an interest terminated upon
notice to employee of, inter alia, employer’s death); S.C. Gen. Stat. § 1302 (1882) (act by agent
question.  Under the common law of partnership, a partner’s death
automatically terminated the relationship of mutual agency that partnership
created among partners.  This meant that if a partner, unaware of a fellow
partner’s death, continued to carry on partnership business, the active partner
had no right to ask the other surviving partners to contribute to any liability,
even though all were ignorant of their fellow partner’s death.   The Uniform96
Partnership Act, drafted by Lewis as its Reporter, changed this rule because
its consequences were “unjust to the acting partner or partners.”   Section 3497
of the Act gives the active partner a right to contribution from fellow co-
partners unless the active partner has knowledge or notice that a partner has
died.  Asked about the implications of the Partnership Act at the 1933 Annual
Meeting, Lewis characterized section 34 as “a deliberate modification of what
I then assumed was general agency law as it had been stated here and the
general agency law which had been worked into the partnership decisions.”98
What’s intriguing is the failure of the Institute to generalize, either from
the existing exceptions to the general agency rule reflected in the caveat to
section 120 or from the policy reflected in the Partnership Act.  The Uniform
Partnership Act)eventually adopted by almost all U.S. jurisdictions)was
completed in 1914 after twelve-plus years’ work on behalf of the Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.   By 1933, nineteen states had99
adopted it.   No one)not even Lewis)appears to have treated the Act as a100
basis on which to draw general principles that might mitigate the impact or
reduce the authority of common-law rules.  101
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under power of attorney or other authority that would bind principal if alive binds principal’s estate
so long as person who dealt with agent dealt bona fide not knowing of principal’s death). In any
event, the Note’s general assertion that “[t]he rule of the common law has been modified with regard
to the law of agency” conflicts with Mechem’s uncontested account of common-law agency doctrine.
See supra note 95.  
102. See Floyd R. Mechem, Discussion of the Tentative Draft, Agency Restatement No. 2, 5 A.L.I. PROC.
324–25 (1927).
103. Id.
104. See Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the
Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an American Law Institute, reprinted in
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 50  ANNIVERSARY 27 (1973). WritingT H
in 1969, Director Wechsler associated the first generation of Restatements with “magisterial
pronouncements, limited commentary, taboo on the citation of decisions, exclusion or subordination
of all statutory matter and elimination of the reporter’s explanatory notes from the official text . . . .”
Wechsler, supra note 80, at 150. Wechsler credits Herbert Goodrich, who succeeded Lewis as
Director, with the “benign but forthright aegis” under which “steady progress” occurred in
Restatement methodology:
As the work proceeds today, the emphasis has shifted from dogmatic affirmation to, as
near as may be, reasoned exposition. The black letter is accompanied by an extensive set
of comments submitted to the institute for its consideration and approval. There are no
artificial rules as to the content of the comments. They are meant to be explanatory and
expositive of the black letter; often, the main content will be there. When statutory
developments have been important in a field, the statutes will be analyzed and noted:
witness the important change in this respect in the current revision of the Restatement of
Contracts. 
Id.  For Goodrich’s reflections on Lewis, see supra note 44.
More generally, the Restatement did not treat statues as sources of
authority with which to counter or reshape common-law rules, even in the face
of a widely-adopted statutory provision. Thus, the Comment to section 122
preserved the common-law rule that a woman’s marriage destroyed her
capacity to contract and thus to be bound by an agent’s transactions.
Discussion of this point at the 1927 Annual Meeting acknowledged that many
states had abolished the common-law rule, with Mechem noting that several
still followed it.   A member had asked whether any state still followed the102
common-law rule (which he termed “barbarous”) and urged that if none did,
the rule should be omitted.   This recommendation was not followed. 103
To be sure, the exclusion of statutes as principled sources of authority is
compatible with statement in the Institute’s 1923 founding document that
focused its work on stating “the existing law as found in the decisions and
scattered statutes.”   However, the Uniform Partnership Act was internally104
coherent, not “scattered,” and the rate by which states had adopted it by 1933
implies that its assessment of how the underlying problem should be resolved
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105. The Institute subsequently recognized that a statute may state an approach that’s preferable to a
common-law rule and that a Restatement may properly adopt and endorse the statute’s approach as
“much like a newer line of cases announcing a better rule.” AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CAPTURING
THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: A HANDBOOK FOR ALI REPORTERS AND THOSE WHO
REVIEW THEIR WORK 8 (2005). For discussion of the range of relationships between common-law
doctrines and statutes in the agency context, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, Introduction
6–10; Deborah A. DeMott, Statutory Ingredients in Common Law Change: Issues in the
Development of Agency Doctrine, in COMMERCIAL LAW AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICE 57 (Sarah
Worthington ed., 2003). 
106. See Livingston Hall, Warren Seavey and the Age of the Restatement, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1331
(1966). Professor Hall, Seavey’s colleague, wrote of him: “I have always believed that he thought in
Restatement terms. Logical order, internal consistency, completeness, clear illustrative cases,
brevity)these were his intellectual goals.” 
107. On Seavey’s intellectual style and contribution through the Restatements to law reform, see Robert
E. Keeton, Warren Abner Seavey)Teacher, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1335 (1966). Judge (then
Professor) Keeton wrote that Seavey’s work “reflected a profound respect for judges and their judicial
labors.” Id. at 1335. Seavey thus did not focus on legislation as the preferred institution for legal
reform. And his contributions “were primarily aimed at organizing and clarifying the valid and at
pruning away the fallacious.” Id. 
might better reflect contemporary judgment than the rule of automatic
termination upon death stated in the Restatement’s section 120.  105
V.  CONCLUSION
An unquestioned and narrow understanding of what counted as “the law”
that the Reporters and the Institute might “find” reduced the prospect that the
Agency Restatement would generate wider-ranging substantive reform.
Mechem, who “knew all the cases,” proved unable to distill what he knew
with sufficient clarity and parsimony to meet the Institute’s needs.  Although
Seavey’s intellectual acuteness and drafting skill suited him well to an
enterprise for which internal coherence and brevity were crucial,  these are106
not traits that necessarily expand or deepen an understanding of what should
count as “the law” or the directions in which law will or should evolve.107
Moreover, Seavey’s role as Mechem’s successor may itself have inhibited
temptations to be bolder, given the difficulty of extensively redrafting the
profuse statements of a predecessor so knowledgeable about cases on the
micro-level.  Although these limitations do not diminish the value of what the
first Restatement accomplished, they cabined its impact to a world in which
proper placement within a taxonomic scheme was in itself assumed to do
much of the work requisite to justifying the outcome reached by application
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108. Although Professor Seavey’s colleague, Louis Loss, gives him sole credit for making “a coherent
subject out of Agency,” surely Mechem, Lewis, and their colleagues within the ALI deserve credit
as well! See LOSS, supra note 27, at 76.
of legal doctrine.   Nonetheless, by demonstrating that a coherent account108
could be given of agency law, Mechem and Seavey secured the subject’s
independent place within the family of foundational legal doctrine.  
